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Switzerland, long regarded as a beacon of financial stability and innovation, finds its reputation under scrutiny in 2024. Despite the country’s famed “Swiss financial mechanism” that underscores its leadership in global finance, startling revelations indicate that illicit financial channels may be thriving right under our noses.
| 22 December 2024, London, UKNG News, London, UK | David McCandlessJournalist and Senior [email protected] |
 | In October, our team uncovered a chilling revelation: a crowdfunding platform within the Europe actively facilitating financial support for Boko Haram, the notorious terrorist organization infamous for the abduction of 257 schoolgirls in Borno State, Nigeria, in 2019. Operating through murky www.freedom2borno.com, this platform brazenly exploited modern payment systems, allowing contributors to channel funds toward guerrilla operations. Disturbingly, donors could crowdfund items such as drones, tactical vests, and even sign bombs with their names to boast about their involvement on social media—a grotesque combination of vanity and violence.In December 2024, after persistent efforts and a formal complaint to Google, we succeeded in shutting down this platform. While this particular platform has been dismantled, the deeper issue remains. The infrastructure for illegal transfers—through legal-seeming payment channels in the EU and UK—continues to thrive. How can such illicit operations flourish in a jurisdiction as stringently regulated as Switzerland? | ||
| Source: https://www.talk-finance.co.uk/international/freedom2borno-openly-recruits-members-and-collects-donations-for-boko-haram-by-using-legal-payment-processors/ | |||
The Hidden Currents: Investigating the Shadow Economy of EU-Nigeria Money Transfers
Our inquiry began with a simple yet pressing question: How is the flourishing trade of illicit goods financed in today’s world?
According to World Bank statistics, (source link) personal remittances to Nigeria from abroad reached a staggering $20.5 billion in 2023. The same official statistics report that personal remittances paid within Nigeria amount to just $84.1 million. Where is the rest of the money going?
The numbers don’t add up. This significant gap suggests that alternative, unofficial channels are facilitating cash flows, bypassing regulatory oversight.
Darknet and Swiss Bricks-and-Mortar agencies: How Illegal Transfers Evade Scrutiny in Plain Sight
The Darknet is the epicenter of illegal commerce, where you can purchase anything from drugs to arms and Money Transfers section—no legal ID required, So we decided to test the waters. Contacting one of these agents, we posed as an ordinary factory worker based in Switzerland and requested a $100 transfer to an address in Borno, Nigeria. To escalate the stakes, we deliberately provided the name SALIHU YUSUF ADAMU, a known terrorist listed on the U.S. SDN sanctions list.
The response was swift and unambiguous:
“Any name is fine. Just pay us in cryptocurrency.”
The agent provided a cryptocurrency wallet—Iron Wallet—for the payment. This was hardly surprising, as Iron Wallet was previously advertised on the now-shuttered Freedom2Borno website, which we exposed as a crowdfunding platform for Boko Haram. The transaction was entirely feasible, with no checks or safeguards.
To corroborate these findings, we next turned to physical money transfer agents. These were brick-and-mortar establishments that had been advertised on the Freedom2Borno platform before its closure. Despite the publicity generated by our first article exposing illegal practices, the system remains disturbingly intact.
An insider from our team walked into a modestly furnished Zurich shop, posing again as the same factory worker. He carried an envelope of cash and provided a “magic password,” scribbled on the outside, as instructed. The result? A seamless transaction. Below is the receipt for the transfer, proving that this illicit activity persists, right under the noses of Swiss and EU regulators.
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What began as an isolated discovery of illicit fundraising has unraveled into a far-reaching and sinister network of financial misconduct. Through deeper investigations, supported by whistleblower accounts and insider information, we have uncovered a shadowy system of cashflows that directly links entities in Switzerland, the UK, and other EU jurisdictions to terrorist’s operations in Borno, Nigeria.
Here is the cashflow pathway we have reconstructed:
- Glo Currency UK Limited’s Role:
This entity appears central to the operation. Its Swiss subsidiary, Glo Currency Travel and Tours GmbH, is already on FINMA’s warning list (source). - Redeem GmbH:
Operating as an agent for Glo Currency, Redeem GmbH seems to act façade or a nominee entity, potentially to circumvent regulatory bans on Glo Currency in Switzerland. - Cash Xpress Financial Services SARL:
This organization reportedly employs dual systems—some transactions are formalized with receipts, while others mimic Glo Currency’s cash in envelope-based transfers. - Change Leman’s Dubious Licensing:
Operating from Rue du Mont-Blanc in Geneva, Change Leman is allegedly a French-registered entity without proper Swiss licensure (source). Its dual role in cash handling and logistics raises eyebrows, with reports of involvement in drug trafficking (source). - Direct Connections to Nigerian Militants:
We hold documented transfers flagged by the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) linking Swiss operations to Boko Haram funding.
 | Note: Glo Currency UK Limited (operated by Olatunji Akinwumi OYEBANJI) Redeem GmbH, Redeem Money Transfer (operated by Franklin Ogechukwu Ndupu) Cash Xpress Financial services SARL (operated by Aurélien Mophou Tchapdjo and Léa Ernestine Mophou Tchapdjo) |
A Call for Accountability: From Swiss Bureaucracy to Nigerian Silence:
A Tale of Frustration
This investigation raises a pressing and deeply concerning question: How can such illicit operations flourish in a jurisdiction as stringently regulated as Switzerland?
In the course of our investigation, we sought perspectives and insights from key Swiss financial regulators, including FINMA and POLYREG. However, their response was both unexpected and disheartening. Due to bureaucratic limitations, we were informed that we could not even officially register our complaint because: ” we are not Swiss legal entities”
We’ve long acknowledged the EU’s convoluted and often inefficient mechanisms for handling investigative documents— But to face similar obstacles in Switzerland, a country renowned for its “Swiss clock-like precision,” was nothing short of shocking. Still, we held onto hope, thinking that things might be faster and more straightforward in Nigeria. How naïve we were.
Our attempt to involve the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) and the Nigerian Central Bank hit a brick wall. Not only did they close our complaint ticket without any explanation, but when we followed up to inquire about the abrupt closure, we were met with complete silence.
The only plausible explanation? Corruption.
Thus, our findings indicate that the Swiss financial system may also, albeit inadvertently, play host to some of the world’s most dangerous dealings. For a nation synonymous with transparency and trust, this revelation demands action.
